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ABSTRACT
Rising budget deficits and sticker shock over the new Medicare drug benefit have put the issue of 
prescription drug costs back into the spotlight. The growth in the cost of prescription drugs 
continues to represent a staggering burden for taxpayer-funded health care programs, even while 
costs of non-drug health care services have slowed or even decreased. Among the many 
proposals for cutting prescription drug costs, drug importation is unique. Although bipartisan 
support for drug importation has existed in Congress for over five years, the federal government 
continues to maintain that a system of safe and effective drug importation is impossible. This 
paper provides a comprehensive analysis of importation law and legislation as it has evolved 
over the past twenty years. The paper tells the story of drug importation’s checkered legislative 
history, beginning with adulterated Guatemalan birth-control pills and culminating with an 
unprecedented trade embargo by Canadian officials, which may soon prohibit all drug sales to 
customers in the United States. Additionally, the paper looks at the case law that has arisen from 
drug importation and describes how consumers and state governments are now turning to the 
judicial branch to force the federal government to ensure that imported prescription drugs are 
safe and effective for consumers. 

“Should we blame the government?  
Or blame society?  
Or should we blame the images on TV? No! 
Blame Canada, 
Blame Canada . . . .”1
I. THE PROBLEM OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: YOUR MONEY OR YOUR LIFE
INTRODUCTION 
The debate over imported prescription drugs presents unique policy questions and has a 
remarkable political history, as compared to many other issues affecting the health care system. 
While political conflict over health care is often cyclical, importation2 is unusual in the sense that 
Congress has already provided statutory authorization for such a program twice in the past five 
years, without any response from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).3 Recently, the 
political battle over imported prescription drugs has approached a turning point. Record budget 
deficits and expanding entitlement costs at the state and federal levels are putting new pressure 
on lawmakers to cut health care expenses, especially for prescription drugs. Support for an 
operational drug importation program appears to have once again peaked among both 
Republican and Democratic members of Congress.4 At the state level, several governors have 
begun ad hoc importation programs5 and Vermont has taken the additional step of using the 
judicial system to force changes in the regulation of imported prescription drugs.6
For better or worse, the current rules regarding prescription drug importation appear to be 
on the verge of wide-scale change. Pharmaceutical companies have begun cutting off supplies to 
Canadian pharmacies suspected of selling to American clients, while Canada itself is considering 
cutting off all supplies to American consumers.7 The FDA’s ineffective and sporadic inspections 
of the increasing number of drugs currently being imported provide little distinction between 
2drugs from countries with respected regulatory systems and those from unregulated, possibly 
dangerous sources.8 The drug industry maintains that foreign price controls make it necessary for 
U.S. consumers to pay higher prices for prescription drugs. However, there are clear indications 
that Americans who rely on life-saving medications for their health care needs are no longer 
willing to simply “blame Canada.”  
 This note will provide a comprehensive analysis of the issue of prescription drug 
importation from Canada and other foreign countries. Part One provides an overview of 
prescription drug pricing as a public policy problem. The paper will analyze the main reasons 
why drug costs and utilization have increased dramatically in recent years, and why Americans 
continue to pay more for drugs than people in any other country. Part Two offers a discussion of 
state and federal attempts to lower prescription drug spending through negotiated prices, similar 
to foreign countries’ drug laws. This paper also discusses how rising drug prices present a 
significant threat to the solvency and continued existence of health care and prescription drug 
subsidy programs for low-income and older Americans. Part Three introduces the concept of 
importation, providing a review of the legislative history of importation laws in Congress and 
explaining why nearly twenty years of legislation has failed to create an operational drug 
importation system. Part Four presents an analysis of the current importation debate and the 
different legislative options being considered by Congress. Part Five describes the fight over 
importation laws in the judicial system and the challenges of trying to achieve policy changes 
through litigation.  
A. OVERDOSING ON PRESCRIPTION DRUG EXPENDITURES 
Prescriptions drugs have become a central component of the American health care 
system.9 The data is most pronounced among older Americans. Ninety percent of seniors report 
3taking prescription drugs, and among those using at least one prescription drug, nearly half 
reported using five or more different drugs.10 
Prescriptions drugs are rapidly replacing hospital services and therapy as the main type of 
health care expenditures for Americans.11 Prescription drug expenditures currently constitute 
more than 12 percent of all personal health care expenditures12 and this is expected to rise to 17 
percent by 2014.13 Overall, U.S. expenditures on prescription drug have more than tripled over 
the last decade.14 In 1993, the annual increase in spending on prescription drugs was six percent, 
equivalent to spending increases for hospital care, physicians, and clinical services.15 During the 
subsequent decade, overall spending on health care continued to rise around 6 to 9 percent per 
year, but was completely outpaced by the growth in the rate of expenditures on prescription 
drugs. Since 1996, annual spending increases for prescription drugs have been in the double 
digits. Prescription drug spending increases peaked in 1999, with a one-year, 20 percent increase. 
Annual growth in expenditures dropped to 15 percent in 2002 and fell to 10.7 percent in 2003, 
the most recent year data is available.16 However, future prescription drug spending is expected 
to stay at or near double digit growth.17 
Recent slower growth in prescription drug spending was an expected18 consequence of 
aggressive price regulation by medical insurers, an economic recession, and cuts in insurance 
coverage by employers. The proportion of Americans receiving insurance from an employer hit a 
nine-year low in 2003: only 60.4 percent of the population.19 Although most employers still 
offering insurance coverage do provide prescription drug benefits,20 employees are being forced 
to pay a rising portion of the cost of prescriptions through various cost-sharing techniques.21 
According to employers, 53 percent have increased prescription drug co-payments or 
4coinsurance for pharmaceuticals.22 Given the rapid rate of increases in employee cost sharing, 
even people with drug coverage may resort to importing their drugs from overseas.  
 Rising prescription drug expenditures are partly driven by price increases. 
Manufacturers’ prices for the 200 most widely-used brand name prescription drugs rose at an 
annual rate of 4.1 percent in 2000, but increased at a rate of 7 percent per year in 2003 and 2004, 
even while general inflation fell to approximately 2 percent.23 The drug industry claims that 
retail prescription drug inflation was on par or below inflation rates of medical services, but their 
data fails to distinguish between generic and brand name prescription drug price increases.24 
Another cause of increasing drug expenditures is the growth in the use of higher-priced 
brand name drugs. Prescription drug companies have become more adept at maintaining 
consumer demand for their brand name products, despite expiring patents. For example, 
AstraZeneca spent $500 million a year to convince heartburn sufferers to switch from brand 
name Prilosec (about to go off-patent), to its new and “improved” brand name drug, Nexium, 
which was almost identical chemically.25 
The main driver of growth in drug expenditures is increased utilization.26 Between 1993 
and 2003, the number of prescriptions purchased increased by 70 percent.27 Growth in drug 
utilization is driven by societal beliefs and health care modernization. Americans generally 
believe that prescription drugs have a “positive impact” on their health and quality of life, and 
have made a “big difference” in the lives of people with chronic conditions.28 According to 
industry sources, the 300 new medicines approved by the FDA in the last decade have “improved 
the treatment of common diseases like heart disease, diabetes and cancer, as well as rare 
disorders . . . .”29 Scientific studies show that prescription drugs can significantly lower 
institutional health care costs. For example, one study reported that, “the use of newer medicines 
5increased drug costs by $18, but reduced hospital and other non-drug costs by $129,” a savings 
of over $6 for every $1 spent on newer pharmaceuticals.30 
B. HIGHER DRUG PRICES COST LIVES 
Drugs only produce health savings if the patient can afford to actually purchase the drug. 
The increasing costs of prescription drugs have had significant consequences on the affordability 
of health insurance for millions of Americans. In 2003, nearly 45 million Americans were 
uninsured at some time during the year, the highest number of uninsured since 1998.31 The drug 
industry does offer modest discount programs for certain groups of people with extremely low 
incomes (usually below 150 to 200 percent of the Federal Poverty Level), when those people are 
not otherwise eligible for any other form of government assistance.32 Estimates of the total 
number of non-elderly Americans lacking drug coverage range from 58 million to 67 million, 
mostly due to age and income limitations on government health care programs.33 
Research shows that price does have a direct effect on low-income Americans’ ability to 
access medically-necessary drugs. Among all seniors nationwide, 25 percent have foregone 
prescription medications in the past year because of the cost of the drugs.34 Among seniors with 
no drug coverage, 37 percent gave up medications.35 Additionally, “a one-dollar increase in the 
out-of-pocket per tablet cost resulted in the purchase of 114 fewer tablets per year.”36 The 
expense of drugs is deterring a growing proportion of the elderly and near-elderly from taking 
medically necessary medicines, up from 13 percent in 1986 to 22 percent in 2002.37 
C. WHY DO AMERICANS PAY SO MUCH FOR DRUGS?
The unparalleled growth in the cost of prescription drugs in the U.S. is even more 
shocking when compared other industrialized countries’ prices for prescription drugs. In a recent, 
cross-national study comparing drug prices in Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
6Mexico, and the United Kingdom with U.S. drug prices – only Japan had higher prices.38 Foreign 
drug prices ranged from six percent to 40 percent lower than U.S. prices.39 However, generic 
drug prices were equivalent or higher than U.S. prices in almost every country in the study.40 The 
result is that Americans, “who account for a fraction of prescription drug use worldwide . . . pay 
for about half of all pharmaceutical spending worldwide.”41 
The major reason for these differences in drug prices between the U.S. and other 
countries are differing regulatory laws and agencies used to control drug manufacturing and 
pricing.42 Canada’s Patented Medicine Prices Review Board (PMPRB) was established in 198743 
as an independent, quasi-judicial tribunal and limits the prices set by manufacturers for all 
patented medicines, new and existing, sold in Canada, to ensure they are not excessive.44 To 
determine if prices are excessive, the PMPRB considers various factors mandated in statute.45 
These factors include: the price of medicines for therapies used to treat the same disease, the 
price of similar medicines in other developed countries (a practice known as reference pricing), 
changes in the Consumer Price index, and other factors such as making and marketing the 
medicine.46 The PMPRB is statutorily forbidden from taking research costs into consideration, 
but may include the Canadian portion of the worldwide research costs related to a drug’s 
invention, calculated in proportion to the ratio of Canadian sales to total world sales.47 In this 
manner, Canada has ensured that its citizens never pay more than their fair share of research 
costs and Canadian prices of patented medicines can never be the highest in the world.  
 Government-mandated price controls for prescriptions drugs are a fiercely-debated 
subject in current international trade jurisprudence. The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) 
agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)48 “attempts to 
strike a balance between the long term social objective of providing incentives for future 
7inventions and creation, and the short term objective of allowing people to use existing 
inventions and creations.”49 While a full analysis of WTO regulations regarding intellectual 
property is beyond the scope of this paper, some of the major provisions are worth noting. The 
TRIPS agreement effectively authorized ‘compulsory licensing’ – which occurs “when a 
government allows someone else to produce the patented product or process without the consent 
of the patent owner.”50 Compulsory licensing authority is limited by provisions in TRIPS Article 
31, which state: 
Where the law of a Member allows for other use of the . . . patent without the 
authorization of the right holder . . . such use may only be permitted if . . . (b) . . . 
the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder 
on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not 
been successful . . . (c) the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the 
purpose for which it was authorized . . . (f) any such use shall be authorized 
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member [country] 
authorizing such use . . . .51 
Through later amendments, the TRIPS agreement was modified52 so that in cases of “‘national 
emergencies,’ ‘other circumstances of extreme urgency’ or ‘public non-commercial use’ (or 
‘government use’) or anti-competitive practices, there is no need to try for a voluntary license.”53 
These treaties allow WTO member countries to use compulsory licensing powers to leverage 
discounted prices for their national health care programs, import generic equivalents, or license 
another domestic producer to manufacture generic versions of a patented product.54 For example, 
Brazil used compulsory licensing powers under the TRIPS agreement to produce generic copies 
of AIDS drugs and distribute them for free, thereby cutting its AIDS rates by 80% since 1996.55 
The main risk of government-mandated pricing is that the drug manufacturers may delay 
or deny supplies of certain breakthrough prescription drugs. The pharmaceutical industry claims 
that European price controls have resulted in restricted access to treatments for about 20 common 
conditions, such as migraines, acute asthma, and certain biotechnologies.56 In terms of 
8accessibility to new drugs, the drug industry argues that Europeans witnessed just over half as 
many new drug launches as compared to the United States (44 versus 85) from 1998 to 2002.57 
There does seem to be significant diversity in the types of drugs consumed across different 
countries, but there is no clear connection between price controls and drug availability. One 
study of 249 molecules sold in nine countries found that those molecules accounted for 61 to 62 
percent of sales in the U.S., Canada, and the U.K., but only 31 to 42 percent of sales in other 
countries.58 This suggests that the six other countries may have greater consumption of drugs that 
are unavailable or have relatively low sales in the U.S., Canada, and the U.K.59 
D. DO HIGHER DRUG COSTS SUPPORT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT?
The industry’s main argument against foreign pricing policies is that that it will result in 
the loss of adequate incentives for research and development of new medicines. The industry 
offers detailed statistics showing what it claims is evidence of shifting R&D investment and 
physical relocation of research laboratories from Europe to the United States, thus proving the 
effect of free-market policies on innovation.60 Unfortunately for the industry, their own statistics 
on R&D expenditures fail to support their conclusions. According to the PhRMA 2005 Industry 
Profile, its member companies spent approximately 3.76 times more on domestic than foreign 
R&D in 2004.61 On its face, this ratio suggests a wide disparity in research expenditures. In fact, 
the 2004 ratio is the fourth lowest ratio since 1970. The average ratio of domestic to foreign 
R&D expenditures over the last five years is the lowest of any five-year period in thirty years. 
The growth in foreign R&D expenditures is not simply a result of out-sourcing to developing 
countries with cheaper labor. PhRMA member companies in both France and Germany increased 
R&D expenditures by more than 200% between 2002 and 2003, while U.S. R&D expenditures 
increased by around 5% in the same time period.62 Despite PhRMA’s claims, there is rapid 
9growth in foreign R&D expenditures by PhRMA’s member drug companies, relative to domestic 
R&D expenditures.63 This may be a result of mergers and acquisitions of U.S. pharmaceutical 
companies by European drug makers.64 
Opponents of price controls have argued that the only fair way to lower U.S. drug costs, 
without reducing the monies available for research, is to persuade foreign governments to raise 
their drug prices.65 President George W. Bush explained that “more people [should] share in the 
opportunity to help pay for the research that goes into drugs.”66 Surprisingly, this argument 
appears to have met with success in recent negotiations involving trade with Australia.67 
Developing countries may question the logic of raising their drug prices, given how hard it is for 
their citizens to afford drugs at existing prices.68 Despite these concerns, countries like India 
have rewritten their patent laws to add additional protections for higher drug prices, in order to 
lure drug companies into shifting operations to India.69 India already has the most FDA-approved 
manufacturing facilities of any country outside the U.S.70 
Drug manufacturers claim that high drug prices are essential to providing the immense 
research capital involved in bringing a new drug to market. To support this theory, the industry 
frequently quotes a Tufts University study which found that that the average pre-tax cost of new 
drug development was $802 million and lasted 16 years on average.71 This statistic has been 
widely debunked as over-inflated.72 The Tufts study excluded drugs that were merely 
‘improvements’ on existing drugs (known as ‘me-too drugs’).73 The study also doubled the real 
cost estimate of $403 million, in order to factor in the “opportunity cost” of the investment 
capital.74 The other gaping hole in the industry’s research and development (R&D) cost estimate 
is the fact that a large portion of basic drug research is conducted within academic institutions 
which receive funding from federal, state and local government sources. According to a Public 
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Citizen review of internal National Institute of Health (NIH) documents, “U.S. taxpayer-funded 
researchers conducted 55 percent of the published research projects leading to the discovery and 
development of [the top five selling drugs in 1995],” each of which had over $1 billion in sales.75 
The debate over R&D raises serious questions about the industry’s practices and fiscal 
priorities. Even if the real R&D cost per drug is only $400 million, the industry is still spending 
prolific amounts of money for FDA approval only to see three out of 10 of their approved drugs 
actually earn back the average cost of R&D.76 The real problem seems to be the “strongly 
diminishing returns on R&D spending . . . . As R&D spending has soared in the past decade, 
[government] drug approvals have declined.”77 Rather than developing innovative new cures, drug 
companies are spending their research dollars solely to develop ‘me too’ drugs – drugs designed to 
imitate the effects of something already on the market. Of the seventy-eight drugs approved by the 
FDA in 2002, only seventeen contained new active ingredients, and only seven of these were 
classified as improvements over older drugs.78 Another drain on the drug industry’s returns may be 
their phenomenal expenditures for marketing and advertising to consumers and physicians. Direct-
to-consumer pharmaceutical advertising currently costs the drug industry approximately $4 billion 
annually.79 This evidence suggests that prescription drug pricing may have little or nothing to do 
with the quality and quantity of research and development performed by the industry.  
 
II. LEGISLATING PRICE CONTROLS: SIDE EFFECTS MAY VARY
A. USING TAX-PAYER MONEY TO SUBSIDIZE DRUG PRICES 
1. Medicaid Coverage of Drugs  
 
The most basic way to address the challenges prescription drug coverage is to provide a 
direct, tax-payer funded subsidy to certain low-income and elderly populations. Prior to January 
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2006, the Medicaid program provided the main source of prescription drug coverage to low-
income and elderly Americans. Medicaid provided outpatient drug coverage to approximately 
54.6 million beneficiaries enrolled in Medicaid as of 2004.80 Medicaid paid $33.8 billion for 
prescription drug expenditures in 2003, comprised of $13.8 billion in state expenditure and $20 
billion in federal matching funds.81 Medicaid expenditures on drugs are around 12.6 percent of 
total Medicaid spending.82 Prescription drugs are an optional service, but every state provides 
some coverage, subject to a wide variety of restrictions and cost-sharing.83 Under federal law, 
any state that chooses to provide outpatient drug coverage must cover all FDA-approved drugs of 
any manufacturer which has entered into a rebate agreement with the Secretary of HHS.84 
Direct subsidies for prescription drug coverage are problematic because of the 
tremendous cost of such programs. Between 1999 and 2003, Medicaid spending on prescription 
drugs grew at an average rate of 18.6 percent per year, nearly double the annual average growth 
rate of Medicaid spending.85 This growth rate is simply unsustainable in an era of rising state 
budget deficits. As a result of the economic recession of 2001, states experienced budget 
shortfalls of approximately $200 billion from 2002 to 2004.86 States have focused on Medicaid 
as a major area for cost containment and budget cuts. Every state in the country has implemented 
some form of Medicaid cost control measure recently and some states implemented new cuts 
every year during the state fiscal year 2003 to 2006 period.87 The new Medicare drug benefit will 
put additional pressure on states’ Medicaid budgets, as described below.  
2. State Pharmacy Assistance Plans 
 
As of 2005, twenty-one states had established state-funded programs to provide low-
income and medically needy senior citizens and individuals with disabilities with direct financial 
assistance for prescription drugs (rather than simply offering discounts on prescription drug 
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purchases).88 Such programs, defined by CMS as state pharmacy assistance programs (SPAP), 89 
provide ‘wrap-around’ drug coverage to populations who would not otherwise receive benefits. 
Due to the high cost of such direct subsidy programs, eligibility is often limited to those with low 
incomes.90 Only ten states provide benefits to the non-elderly disabled.91 SPAPs provided 
benefits to 1.3 million enrollees in 2002 at a cost of around $2.6 billion.92 Although, it is 
important to note that enrollees in three states’ SPAP programs, those of New Jersey, New York 
and Pennsylvania, together comprise nearly two thirds of all SPAP enrollees.93 
3. Medicare Coverage of Drugs  
 
a.  The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988   
 The first attempt to offer prescription drug coverage in Medicare was the legislative 
failure known as the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (MCCA). Under section 202 
of the MCCA, Medicare would have provided outpatient drug coverage to all eligible 
beneficiaries beginning in 1991.94 The benefit required an annual deductible of $600 and a 
declining coinsurance payment of 50 percent, both intended to restrain the cost growth of the 
entitlement expansion.95 The law would have benefited approximately 8 million people with an 
annual cost of $10 billion when fully implemented in 1993.96 The law was funded through a 
surtax of $22.50 on every $150 of tax liability of upper income Medicare beneficiaries, up to 
$800 a year, and a $4 per month increase in Medicare Part B premiums for all Medicare 
recipients.97 On July 1, 1988, President Reagan signed the bill into law.98 
A mere sixteen months later, the Act was relegated to the dustbin of history. Thousands 
of older Americans vociferously protested the surtax and premium increases as an unfair burden 
on people with fixed incomes.99 In December 1989, President George H.W. Bush signed the 
Catastrophic Coverage Repeal Act of 1989, eliminating the entire Medicare expansion.100 
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 b.  The Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003  
 It took over fourteen years for Congress to approve another prescription drug benefit in 
Medicare. The Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 
(“MMA”) created Medicare Part D, a prescription drug benefit in Medicare, beginning January 
1, 2006.101 By any measure, the MMA represented historic legislation. The MMA creates a 
voluntary drug benefit for approximately 41.7 million Medicare beneficiaries. The new benefit is 
funded by the federal government, beneficiaries’ cost-sharing, and mandatory payments from 
state governments. While the statute defines the parameters of the benefit, the coverage itself is 
designed and “sold” to Medicare beneficiaries through private Pharmacy Benefit Managers 
(PBM),102 for-profit companies which currently operate as intermediaries between 
pharmaceutical manufacturers and private managed care insurance companies. As PBMs take on 
increasing importance in the drug pricing and Medicare debates, some states have taken a more 
active approach towards regulating the PBM industry to ensure drug cost savings are truly being 
passed on to insurance consumers.103 
Under the MMA, Medicare covers approximately 75 percent104 of eligible beneficiaries’ 
annual drug expenditures between $250105 and $2,250,106 zero percent of expenditures between 
$2,250 and $5,100, 107 and 100 percent of expenditures above $5,100.108 Enrollees are required to 
pay a $2 co-payment for generics, $5 for brand name drugs, or 5 percent co-insurance.109 The 
drug benefit will cost the average senior citizen $722 annually, but those with chronic conditions 
can expect to pay double that amount and face gaps in coverage for up to five months.110 
The Part D drug benefit represents a massive government subsidy of privatized 
prescription drug insurance for the nation’s elderly. The law leaves all price-negotiating 
authority in the private sector.111 In fact, the MMA affirmatively prohibits the Secretary of HHS 
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from negotiating a particular pricing structure. Under the MMA, this is considered ‘interfering’ 
with the negotiations between drug manufacturers and pharmacies and PBMs.112 The private 
PBM negotiating entities are required to assume much of the risk of cost overruns in submitting 
their bids to manage the drug benefit.113 However, the large number and types of drugs that must 
be covered114 by all approved drug plans may put “upward pressure on premiums” or require 
increases in federal reimbursement.115 Federal actuarial estimates for the MMA reflected these 
concerns, but were not publicly available until after the law’s passage.116 While Medicare spent 
$2.8 billion on prescription drugs in 2003, that amount is expected to rise to $69.9 billion in 2006 
and to continue increasing by approximately 10 percent every year after that.117 These rising 
costs will help push the Medicare Trust Fund into bankruptcy around 2020.118 
The budget-busting costs of a new entitlement program created serious political hurdles 
for the MMA’s authorizing legislation. Faced with a revolt by fiscal conservatives and the real 
possibility of a defeat on the floor of the House of Representatives, the Republican leadership 
resorted to unprecedented arm-twisting tactics against their own members of Congress,119 and 
held open the usual fifteen minute voting period for four hours.120 In the Senate, the measure 
passed by a narrow margin amidst heated debate and along decidedly mixed party lines.121 
In addition to its limits on federal negotiating power, the MMA severely curtails states’ 
cost containment options for their Medicare/Medicaid, dual eligible population. Under the law’s 
“clawback” provision,122 states are statutorily required to pay the federal government a large 
proportion of monies they would have spent on prescription drugs for their dual eligible 
population.123 This transfer from state to federal government forces the states to maintain their 
2003 Medicaid drug expenditures, irregardless of state-law changes subsequent to the MMA. 
Even worse, the law precludes states from receiving any negotiated rebates or discounts for the 
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dual eligible population because states are no longer allowed to preference particular drugs or 
interfere in any way with the private contracts negotiated by the private pharmacy benefit 
mangers. The end result is that states will force non-elderly, low-income Medicaid beneficiaries 
to shoulder the costs of dual eligibles’ prescription drugs.124 The legality of the ‘clawback’ 
provisions is likely to be challenged by states, once the drug benefit goes into effect.125 
B. USING GOVERNMENT POWER TO CONTROL PRICES 
In many ways, the decision to disallow government negotiation of drug price discounts 
through the new Medicare law represents a major shift in policy. Though the pharmaceutical 
industry often touts the “free market” for prescription drugs, only the uninsured are forced to pay 
market-rate prices for prescription drugs. Health insurance companies normally negotiate price 
discounts for enrollees directly with drug manufacturers, or outsource this responsibility to their 
PBM subcontractors.126 Additionally, both the federal and numerous state governments have 
imitated foreign countries’ ‘price control’ systems by utilizing bulk purchasing power to 
negotiate price discounts on prescription drugs.  
1. Federal use of Price Controls  
 
The federal government currently uses statutorily-imposed ‘price controls’ for the 
Departments of Veterans Affairs, Defense, the Public Health Services (including the Indian 
Health Service), and the Coast Guard.127 All of these departments obtain prescription drugs 
through the Federal Supply Schedule of the General Services Administration at significant 
discounts over private purchasers. Since 1993, every manufacturer has been required to make 
each ‘covered drug’ available for the FSS.128 The effective price charged during any one-year 
period cannot exceed 76 percent of the non-Federal average manufacturer price (NFAMP), 
which means a mandatory 24 percent discount is imposed on all drugs sold to these federal 
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departments or agencies.129 Failure to provide such a discount can result in a manufacturer 
becoming ineligible for receiving payment for the purchase of drugs through Medicaid.130 In 
addition, the VA has obtained some drug prices that are even lower than FSS prices through 
national contracts based on a competitive-bid process.131 While the FSS has been an effective 
cost-control for a limited number of eligible agencies, expanding the FSS price discounts to 
additional government programs (such as Medicare) could result in price increases for the 
uninsured and private sector drug purchasers.132 
2. States’ Preferred Drug Lists  
 
Federal law also requires drug manufacturers to provide rebates to states’ Medicaid 
programs for all ‘covered’ outpatient drugs.133 Thirty-seven states have enacted additional laws 
creating a preferred drug list (PDL) or supplemental rebate system for Medicaid, their state 
employee benefits program, or other state-funded health insurance programs.134 PDLs are simply 
lists of medications designated as “preferred” by a Pharmaceutical and Therapeutics Committee 
(P&T). States may select “preferred drugs” from different classes of pharmaceuticals based on 
the P&T Committee’s findings on therapeutic action, safety, clinical outcomes, and cost.135 
Medications on the PDL are those that the plan’s beneficiaries may purchase. Often, PDLs use 
adjusted co-payments as additional incentives for the consumer to purchase generic or preferred 
drugs, rather than brand name ones.  
 Typically, PDLs save money by excluding the most expensive drugs in any given 
therapeutic class, meaning that beneficiaries are limited in their selection of drug products. Drugs 
that are excluded from the list are not covered, or may require that a prescribing physician obtain 
prior authorization.136 Prior authorization is a process through which physicians must request and 
receive official permission before a particular drug or set of drug products can be dispensed.137 
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The operational effect is that physicians tend to prescribe drugs that are cheaper and equally 
therapeutically effective before turning to expensive alternatives.138 Almost all states require 
prior authorization for at least some of the drugs covered by Medicaid.139 A manufacturer must 
agree to pay a supplemental rebate to the state (or the entity managing the drug benefit) in order 
to get a non-preferred product included in the PDL without the prior authorization 
requirement.140 Most PDLs are mandatory for beneficiaries (although Oregon and Mississippi 
use voluntary PDLs).141 PDLs have successfully saved states a significant amount of money. For 
example, Michigan estimates its PDL saves the state approximately $42 million per year,142 
seven percent of the state’s total Medicaid pharmacy expenses.143 
Since September 2002, when the federal government first approved144 the use of 
preferred drug lists to lower the cost of Medicaid drug costs, PDLs have been the subject of 
intense and sustained legal challenges by the drug industry. The industry suffered major legal 
defeats in Maine and Michigan.145 Recent decisions have also seemed to uphold states’ use of 
preferred drug lists to provide drug discounts to non-Medicaid beneficiaries, subject to CMS 
approval.146 Maine secured discounts of up to 15 percent on brand name drugs and 60 percent for 
generics through voluntary agreements (e.g. no use of prior authorization) while retaining the 
option of using prior authorization in the future.147 States also have a variety of other permissible 
options available to them for limiting prescription drug expenditures and utilization under 
Medicaid,148 although these options are severely curtailed by restrictions imposed by the MMA.  
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III. LEGAL BARRIERS TO IMPORTATION: PROTECTING PATIENTS TO DEATH
A. WHY IMPORTATION?
The prescription drug policy debate represents a continual struggle between three major 
political forces: voters demanding affordable drugs; drug manufacturers’ desire for large profits 
in exchange for innovation; and elected representatives’ attempts to lower costs for public health 
care programs. Importation emerged as a cost-cutting tactic for consumers willing to risk the 
safety hazards of purchasing a drug from outside the United States when faced with the 
alternative of unaffordable domestic drug prices and flawed government drug subsidy programs. 
This section will provide a legislative history of the laws governing prescription drug 
importation and will explain why today, after nearly two decades of Congressional intervention, 
it is still impossible to import legal, safe, and affordable prescription drugs.  
B. LAWS CURRENTLY GOVERNING PRESCRIPTION DRUG IMPORTATION 
1. The Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987 
 
The nation’s first statute governing imported prescription drugs has its origins in a 
pharmacy in Olathe, Kansas.149 In November 1984, two women prescribed with Ovulen-21, a 
widely used birth-control pill, reported complaints of abnormal bleeding.150 The Ovulen-21 pills 
they had received were part of a counterfeit operation that manufactured over 20 million 
substandard or fake Ovulen-21 pills between 1981 and 1984 in Spain and Guatemala and 
imported them into the United States through Panama.151 Though all of the counterfeit pills had 
been removed from pharmacy shelves by January 1985,152 there were growing concerns about 
the expansion of the drugs-by-mail industry.153 The general perception was that American 
consumers could no longer purchase prescription drugs with the certainty that the products were 
safe and effective.154 After holding lengthy public investigations into the issue of counterfeit 
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drugs in both House and Senate, Congress passed the Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987 
(“PDMA”) with strong bipartisan support155 and the law was signed by President Reagan on 
April 22, 1988.156 
The goal of PDMA was to protect American consumers from “mislabeled, subpotent, 
expired, or counterfeit pharmaceuticals . . . and to restore competitive balance in the 
marketplace.”157 The legislation accomplished these goals by amending existing food and drug 
laws in two major ways. First, it created new regulations for controlling what was known then as 
the ‘drug diversion market’ – drugs intended for doctors or hospitals which were being sold on 
the commercial market.158 Under the new text of Title 21, Section 253 of the United States Code, 
sales of drug samples were prohibited159 along with the resale of drugs purchased through 
hospitals or other health care entities.160 Most importantly, the law created a new importation 
law, Title 21, Section 381(d) of the United States Code, which prohibited any drug manufactured 
in the U.S. from being re-imported into the U.S. by anyone other than the person who 
manufactured the drug, with an exception for emergency medical care.161 Violation of the 
importation law was a prohibited act equivalent to misbranding or adulterating a drug.162 Lastly, 
the law created harsh penalties for violations: imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a fine 
of not more than $250,000, or both.163 
There is some ambiguity about the legislative intent of the Congressional supporters of 
PDMA. For example, during the Senate floor debate, Senator John Chafee insisted that the law 
would not affect parallel imports in prescription drugs. “[PDMA] deals with U.S.-manufactured 
products which are reimported. The distribution of gray market goods by independent importers 
was [sic] long been legal in this country and in all countries which are our major trading 
partners.”164 Under PDMA, drugs manufactured anywhere other than the U.S. could still be 
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imported into the U.S., regardless of where the patent holder might be located.165 Senator Warren 
Rudman agreed with Senator Chafee as to the statute’s non- applicability to parallel imports 
while prophetically observing that, “[b]anning reimportation may preserve the ability of drug 
manufacturers to price discriminate against American consumers.”166 
2. The Personal Use Exception to PDMA  
 
The FDA created a major non-statutory exception to importation laws known as the 
personal use exception policy. Prior to 1989, the FDA regularly allowed importation of 
unapproved drugs through mail shipments as long as an importer’s physician requested the 
release of the detained drugs, and the drugs were shipped in personal baggage.167 However, in 
the late 1980s, the FDA amended its policy in response to the numerous demands by AIDS and 
cancer patients for access to potentially life-saving medications and remedies available from 
foreign sources.168 In February 1989, the FDA issued chapter 9-71-30(C) of its Regulatory 
Procedures Manual (RPM) defining the standard that FDA officials were to use to allowing 
personal use exceptions.  
 The most recent version of this policy consists as a subchapter to the Manual for 
Coverage of Personal Importations and applies to mailed shipments or personal baggage 
containing drugs in personal use quantities and values.169 
In deciding whether to exercise discretion to allow personal shipments of drugs or 
devices, FDA personnel should consider a more permissive policy . . . when the 
intended use is appropriately identified, such use is not for treatment of a serious 
condition, and the product is not known to represent a significant health risk . . .  
or when effective treatment is not available domestically.170 
Under this statement of the policy, drugs which would otherwise be available for purchase 
domestically, only imported for price reasons, are not legal.  
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 The Supreme Court upheld the FDA’s personal use policy in a 1992 per curiam opinion 
supporting the confiscation of RU-486 imported for personal use in inducing a non-surgical 
abortion.171 Despite the Court’s decision, the FDA has faced continued criticism that the personal 
use exception policy is arbitrary and capricious.172 The FDA’s response is that the: 
[G]uidance document is not . . . a license for individuals to import unapproved . . . 
drugs for personal use into the U.S., and even if all the factors noted in the 
guidance are present, the drugs remain illegal and the FDA may decide that such 
drugs should be refused entry or seized . . . . The statements in the RPM . . . are 
not intended to create or confer any rights, privileges, or benefits on or for any 
private person.”173 
The result is that the personal use exception policy provides a subjective enforcement right for 
the FDA, while offering little guidance for the public at large about when or which drugs can be 
legally imported for personal use.   
3. The Medicine Equity and Drug Safety Act of 2000  
 
Just as drugs-by-mail had driven the debate over PDMA in 1987, the ease of obtaining 
prescription drugs over the Internet led to new concerns about drug safety in the late 1990s.174 In 
the decade since PDMA, rapid drug price increases created a greater willingness among some 
people to risk purchasing foreign drugs in exchange for lower costs. Thus, the central debate 
over new drug importation legislation involved how to obtain imported drugs safely and in a way 
that would produce savings for consumers.  
 In July 1999, Representative Bernie Sanders, an Independent from Vermont, organized a 
trip for four Vermont residents to nearby Montreal where they were able to buy a three-month 
supply of Tamoxifen, a breast cancer drug, at around 10 percent of the cost of U.S. prices.175 The 
purpose was to illustrate the need for Sanders’ bill, the International Drug Parity Act 
(“IDPA”).176 The IDPA was four pages long and stunningly simply in comparison to current 
proposals. The Act would have amended 21 U.S.C. Section 381(d) to require that manufacturers, 
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as a condition of maintaining domestic approval of a drug, maintain records and labeling of all 
shipments such that they would pass domestic approval were they reimported.177 The Act also 
required the Secretary of HHS to establish regulations to facilitate reimportation.  
 Sanders’ legislation died in committee, but his idea spread quickly. In the months 
following Sanders’ bus trip and leading into the 2000 election, numerous candidates and elected 
representatives duplicated the bus trip and campaigned in support of reimportation, including 
President Bill Clinton, then-First Lady Hilary Clinton, and Vice-President Al Gore.178 In the 
summer of 2000, the Republican Congress and President Clinton appeared deadlocked over a 
Medicare prescription drug benefit, but the concept of reimportation had gained strong bipartisan 
support and appeared to offer both sides an opportunity to legislate on the issue prior to the 
election.179 
The moment finally came during a debate in the Senate over the Agriculture 
Appropriations bill. Senator Jim Jeffords offered his own reimportation legislation, the Medicine 
Equity and Drug Safety Act of 2000 (“MEDS”) in the form of an amendment to the 
appropriations bill.180 Senator Jeffords’ bill was intended to give, “pharmacists and wholesalers 
the ability to negotiate more favorable prices with manufacturers . . . because they will have the 
ability to purchase in other countries . . . .”181 The MEDS Act dropped all references to personal 
importation laws due to safety concerns raised by the FDA.182 During the debate, Senator Thad 
Cochran offered a second degree amendment (amending the Jeffords’ amendment) to, “. . . 
[E]nsure the result of the change in this law . . . will not result in any new dangers to the 
consuming public.”183 Under the Cochran amendment, the new law would become effective only 
if the Secretary of HHS demonstrated to Congress that importation would: “(1) pose no 
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additional risk to the public’s health and safety; and (2) result in a significant reduction in the 
cost of covered products to the American consumer.”184 
Both Senators Jeffords and Slade Gorton expressed skepticism about the true intentions 
of the Cochran amendment.185 Ultimately, Senator Jeffords capitulated, based on his belief that 
the Cochran amendment language meant “‘no risk’ above that which prevails today.”186 
Respected officials have argued that any regulated system of imported drugs would involve less 
risk to public health than our current system.187 The Cochran amendment passed unanimously 
and the MEDS Act passed the Senate 74-21. The Act was signed into law by President Clinton 
on October 28, 2000.188 
The MEDS Act offered a comprehensive drug reimportation program with a permanent 
statutory injunction against implementation interwoven into its text. Under the new text of 21 
U.S.C. Section 384, the Secretary of HHS was required to ensure that each imported product 
complied with the standards for all new drugs as described under 21 U.S.C. Section 355.189 
MEDS required importers to maintain detailed records and make reports to the FDA about an 
imported product’s origins, price, quantity, certification of labeling.190 Section 384(d)(6) required 
documentation and statistical sampling to verify products’ authenticity and degradation.191 
Section 384(f) limited importation to the countries of Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, New 
Zealand, Switzerland, South Africa, and the European Union or a county in the European 
Economic Area.192 Manufacturers were prohibited from using contract power to prevent 
importation.193 The MEDS Act was set to sunset after five years (October 2005).194 Lastly, the 
FDA received $23 million to implement the drug importation system.195 
Only a few weeks after the turbulent ending of the 2000 Election, the MEDS Act was 
effectively killed. On December 26, 2000, Secretary of HHS Donna Shalala, sent a letter to 
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President Clinton informing him that she had declined to request the $23 million from 
Congress196 because an importation program could not be implemented under the safety and 
cost-effectiveness demonstration requirements established by the MEDS Act.197 Shalala pointed 
to three major flaws and loopholes: (1) drug manufacturers could deny U.S. importers legal 
access to the FDA approved labeling that is required for reimportation; (2) drug manufacturers 
could discriminate against foreign distributors that import drugs to the U.S. by requiring them to 
charge higher prices, limit supply, or otherwise treating them less favorably than other foreign 
purchases; and (3) the system’s expiration after five years creates disincentives for private-sector 
investment in the required testing and distribution equipment and limits or eliminates any long-
term cost savings.”198 
To this day, Secretary Shalala continues to believe that importation is a poor substitute 
for government-negotiated price discounts for prescription drugs. In a recent email 
communication, Secretary Shalala stated:  
My basic position has not changed [since December 2000] even though it would 
be easier for [the] FDA to insure the safety of only Canada. It is basically political 
mischief . . . easier than [the government] demanding as a large purchaser [a] 
decent discount . . . . I now believe that the internet has made the whole regulation 
process very difficult.199 
In July 2001, the newly inaugurated Bush Administration declined to reverse Secretary 
Shalala’s decision. In a letter to Senator Jeffords, the new Secretary of HHS, Tommy Thompson, 
stated: 
[I]t would be impossible to ensure that the MEDS Act would result in no loss of 
protection for the drugs supplied to the American people . . . . [T]he MEDS Act 
will pose a greater public health risk than we face today and a loss of confidence 
by Americans in the safety of our drug supply . . . .200 
Thompson also provided a laundry list of factors that would make the cost-effectiveness 
provision impossible to meet.201 
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 Both the Senate and House went on to pass additional importation bills in 2002 and 2003 
without reaching any uniform agreement. On July 31, 2002, the Senate, by a vote of 78 to 21, 
passed S.812, the Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act of 2002.202 S. 812 was 
sponsored by Senators McCain and Schumer and legalized reimportation from Canada only. It 
removed the five year sunset and authorized such appropriations as were necessary for the FDA 
to carry out the law. The House discharge petition failed and the law died, but it later provided 
the basis for the subsequent MMA law’s provisions on importation. Nearly one year later on July 
25, 2003, the House voted 243 to 186 to pass the Pharmaceutical Market Access Act of 2003.203 
In its review of the legislation, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated the federal 
budget savings from lowered drug costs to be a mere $40 billion over the 2004-2013 period.204 
The bill died in the Senate, but demonstrated that the House leadership would no longer be 
capable of stopping the overwhelming number of House members in support of importation.  
4. Importation and the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003  
 
The MMA Act revisited the issue of importation, relying largely on the language of the 
failed 2002 Senate bill.205 The MMA authorized HHS to establish a program permitting 
pharmacists and wholesalers to import prescription drugs from Canada only.206 Although 
individual Americans would still be prohibited from importing drugs from other countries, the 
Secretary of HHS could grant them personal waivers for a 90-day supply of a prescription drug 
from Canada.207 
In reality, the importation provisions of the MMA were nullified by the same statutory 
language as the MEDS Act. The MMA preserved the Cochran amendment language, mandating 
that no importation program could become effective until the Secretary certified it regarding 
safety and cost savings.208 Though some supporters of the MMA claimed the law would allow a 
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safe, new importation program,209 most Senators recognized that the MMA’s importation 
provision was a window dressing.210 In its analysis of the importation provisions of the MMA, 
the Congressional Research Service concluded that, “despite being structured as a replacement to 
the importation provision in the MEDS Act of 2000, [the MMA] does not effectively change 
U.S. prescription drug importation policy.”211 Secretary Thompson confirmed this fact in March 
2004 by again refusing to certify an importation program to Congress, but suggesting that such a 
certification was really just a question of funding for the FDA.212 Ultimately, the only concrete 
step taken with regard to importation as a direct result of the MMA was a comprehensive HHS 
study of the issue.213 
5. State Importation Laws 
 
In response to the continuing inaction on prescription drug pricing at the federal level, 
many states have enacted state drug importation laws. States are limited in their options because 
the federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act preempts most state involvement in prescription drug 
regulation.214 Nonetheless, states such as California, Iowa, Illinois, Minnesota, and New 
Hampshire have begun exploring the prospect of drug importation. At least one municipality, 
Springfield, Massachusetts, has already begun to import foreign drugs for its employees.215 In 
addition, Vermont petitioned the FDA in December 2003, for permission to obtain a waiver of 
federal importation laws for the purpose of providing imported prescription drugs to current and 
retired Vermont state employees.216 
One example of states pushing the boundaries of federal importation law is the I-SaveRx 
program. Since October 2004, I-SaveRx has offered links to internet pharmacies in Canada, the 
United Kingdom and Ireland through the Illinois, Wisconsin, Missouri, Vermont, and Kansas 
state websites.217 The FDA believes such actions are illegal, but has not actually taken 
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affirmative steps against any state to force a suspension of the internet pharmacy programs.218 
The FDA’s opposition may explain why I-SaveRx only processed 6,300 orders between October 
2004 and April 2005.219 
IV. THE CURRENT LEGISLATIVE DEBATE: CAN THE PRESCRIPTION DRUG SYSTEM BE CURED?
A. APPROACHING A CRISIS POINT IN DRUG IMPORTATION 
Twenty years of federal importation laws rife with failure and misguided intentions has 
created a system in crisis. The recent HHS Task Force Report on Drug Importation summarized 
the importation problem as it exists today. “As there has been a significant increase in drug 
utilization and in list prices for drugs in the U.S. over the last few years . . . a relatively small but 
increasing number [of Americans] have turned to importing drugs.”220 This so-called ‘small’ 
number of Americans imported five million shipments, comprising 12 million prescription drug 
products with a value of $700 million from Canada alone in 2003.221 Five percent of seniors 
(approximately 1.8 million people) readily admit to having purchased drugs from Canada or 
Mexico in 2003.222 This massive system of semi-legal imported prescription drugs has become 
one of the largest gray markets223 in existence.   
 Despite its dubious legality, drug importation has now become one of the most popular 
proposals for lowering the cost of health care and prescription drugs. Recent surveys found that 
77 percent of the public supports the idea of Congress allowing Americans to buy prescription 
drugs from pharmacies in Canada and 65 percent do not think importing drugs from Canada will 
expose Americans to unsafe medications.224 
These popular beliefs about safety are not borne out by research regarding the existing 
gray market system. The status quo drug importation market consists of almost completely-
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unregulated internet pharmacies225 and back-alley distributors of imported prescription drugs, 
posing a real threat to Americans’ health, if ignored.226 According to a recent study funded by the 
drug industry, many internet pharmacies do not employ doctors, do not require prescriptions, and 
may require liability waivers from patients.227 Drug products purchased from internet pharmacies 
may be mishandled, mislabeled, or just plain counterfeit.228 ‘Blitzes’229 conducted by the FDA to 
inspect drugs coming in the country are sporadic and inefficient, making meaningful inspection 
by the FDA almost impossible.230 Lastly, each state regulates drug wholesalers and distributors 
differently.231 Both proponents232 and opponents233 of importation recognize the dangers of the 
status quo, but have been unable to reach an agreement about how to deal with such dangers.  
B. AMENDING IMPORTATION LAWS: THE LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS 
The growing frustration over prescription drug prices and the slow start to the Medicare 
drug benefit led to the introduction of several importation bills in both the House and Senate 
during the 2004 session.234 In the 109th Congress, three of the 2004 bills were reintroduced, and 
as of June 2005, appeared to have the greatest chance of success.235 Even with significant 
differences existing between the three options, the current question over importation legislation 
has shifted from “if” to “when.” On May 26, 2005, a majority of Members of the House of 
Representatives signed a letter to Speaker Hastert, asking him to schedule a vote on a drug 
importation bill.236 In part, this is because the issue has become a major source of conflict within 
the Republican Party -- between moderates in favor of lower drug prices and the more 
conservative party leaders, who favor greater price protections for the drug industry.237 
1. Similarities in Proposed Importation Laws 
 
The three major importation legislative proposals are substantially the same with regard 
to the basic operational requirements of an importation program. All three bills strike the existing 
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text of 21 U.S.C. Section 384(l), containing the Cochran amendment language.238 They all 
include extensive registration and inspection requirements,239 labeling,240 and anti-counterfeiting 
systems,241 designed to ensure that imported drugs are in compliance with 21 U.S.C. Section 
331(a). Each bill provides powers for the Secretary of HHS to take steps to prevent importation 
of noncompliant drugs.242 The bills each impose some type of fee on importers to finance the 
inspection and registration process.243 All three bills ban the importation of drugs donated or 
otherwise supplied on a charitable or humanitarian basis.244 
2. Differences in Proposed Importation Laws 
 
The legislative proposals do have significant, substantive differences in how they would 
function. Each bill defines a different list of countries from which drugs could be imported.245 
The bills differ somewhat in their codification of the FDA’s personal use policy, though all three 
generally allow individuals to import a 90-day supply of approved drugs with a valid 
prescription.246 Both the Gregg and Dorgan/Snowe bills create extensive new regulations for 
internet pharmacies.247 
Funding an importation program has created major debate because many opponents 
believe the costs of comprehensive inspection and safety will vastly outweigh any possible 
savings.248 Both the Gregg and Dorgan/Snowe bills authorize appropriations only in the amount 
equal to the funds collected through their various fee levies.249 The Gutknecht bill (perhaps more 
realistically) authorizes appropriations in the amount necessary to carry out the Act.250 
By far, the most significant difference between the laws is their legal treatment of 
manufacturers which retaliate or otherwise discriminate in response to importation of 
prescription drugs products. The Gregg bill lacks any form of limitation on manufacturers’ 
practices. In contrast, the Dorgan/Snowe and Gutknecht have somewhat similar ‘anti-gaming’ 
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provisions designed to prevent, “unfair and discriminatory acts and practices.”251 The exhaustive 
list of unlawful acts includes any possible steps a manufacturer could devise to interfere, 
prohibit, restrict (on the basis of price), or otherwise discriminate the supply of their products on 
the basis of importation activities.252 Both bills authorize the Federal Trade Commission to 
enforce the federal anti-trust provisions and the states’ Attorney Generals to bring civil actions 
for violations and obtain treble damages.253 The anti-gaming provisions are controversial and 
raise legitimate legal questions254 about the federal government’s ability to regulate the 
prescription drug trade to such a degree,255 in addition to being highly politically contentious.256 
However, any importation program would be useless if the industry were able to utilize trade 
embargoes to retaliate against foreign exporters.257 
C. WOULD LEGALIZED DRUG IMPORTATION PROVIDE TANGIBLE BENEFITS?
1. Cost Effectiveness 
 
The current debate over importation remains the dual questions of safety and cost 
effectiveness. Since 1992, the U.S. Congress has had definitive proof that regulatory systems, 
like Canada’s, produce significant cost savings for government purchasers. The first major study 
of Canadian drug pricing was conducted by the General Accounting Office at the request of 
Congressman Waxman, in considering how to lower drug prices for federally funded health 
programs such as the Department of Veterans Affairs.258 The GAO analyzed factory prices of the 
200 most frequently dispensed drugs, matching 121 Canadian products with U.S. products.259 
The median price differential per package between the United States and Canada was 43 percent, 
but the U.S. price differences ranged from 44 percent lower than Canadian prices to 967 percent 
higher.260 Eight additional studies of Canadian drug prices, conducted between 1992 and 2003 
concluded that U.S. drugs were significantly more expensive.261 
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 However, price differentials alone are an insufficient basis for policy conclusions. In its 
April 2004 study of importation, the CBO factored in the effects of predicted import volume, 
price differentials, the discounts already received by private and government sectors, profit-
taking by middlemen, and retaliatory action by the manufacturers – and concluded that legalized 
importation would reduce total drug spending by approximately $4 billion per year or about one 
percent.262 The HHS Task Force on importation came to a similar conclusion after conducting a 
more detailed analysis with the same assumptions, but also admitted that savings on top-selling, 
brand name drugs would average around 37% for individual purchasers from Canada.263 
These conclusions and research results have been met with criticism. For example, 
Donald MacArthur, a former Secretary General for a European Drug Trade Association, who 
provided testimony to the HHS Task Force, offered data showing that European parallel trade 
produced savings of around $821 million (currency adjusted) in 2002 alone, among five EU 
countries with much lower price differentials than exists between the U.S. and other countries.264 
The EU’s parallel trade savings may be understated due to the fact that its market provides few 
incentives for consumers to seek lower-priced drugs and drug prices are already heavily 
regulated.265 Additionally, the figures offered by CBO and HHS represents the savings spread 
out over all purchasers of drugs, many of whom already get significant discounts through their 
health insurance. A better measure would be the prices currently paid by the uninsured, as 
compared to what those same patients would pay under a regulated importation system. As Dr. 
Peter Rost, Vice President of Marketing for Endocrine Care at Pfizer, has stated, “the fight 
against reimportation is a fight to continue to charge our uninsured, our elderly, our poor, our 
weakest, full price, while giving everyone else a rebate.”266 Rost points out that the HHS Task 
Force Report’s conclusions were based on the assumption that administrative, inspection, and 
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transportation costs would manage to consume 80 percent of the price differences between U.S. 
and foreign drugs – “that’s not how the free market works.”267 
2. Safety  
 
The pharmaceutical industry maintains bills like Dorgan/Snowe “would allow products to 
be transshipped . . . from countries that don’t have the same safety standards as the U.S., that 
don’t regulate transshipped products and that, in some cases, have counterfeiting problems.”268 
The industry also believes importation would involve high product-liability insurance costs269 
and would be, “a threat to the innovation of the world’s most innovative pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology research industry.”270 
These assertions ignore the dangers of the present system and the fact that trade can be 
limited to countries with standards similar or exceeding those of the United States. Since 1962, 
the basic requirement for all FDA-approved prescription drugs designed for human consumption 
is that they are scientifically proven to be both safe and effective.271 Canada has similar 
regulations for all new drugs in that manufacturers must provide, “sufficient information and 
material to enable the Minister to assess the safety and effectiveness of the new drug . . . .”272 
Furthermore, the Congressional Research Service has concluded that, “both countries mandate 
strict quality controls, testing standards, and thorough inspections to ensure the safety and 
efficacy of prescription drugs.”273 The industry’s safety arguments seem to have failed to deter 
large numbers of Americans from purchasing their drugs overseas, even without any real 
inspection system in place. 
D. INDUSTRY AND CANADIAN BACKLASH 
In response to the near non-enforcement of existing importation laws by the FDA, the 
pharmaceutical industry has begun taking matters into its own hands. PhRMA has started a 
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major public relations campaign to combat the popular perception of importation as a cure-all for 
prescription drug pricing problems.274 More ominously, several major drug companies have 
refused to supply Canadian pharmacies identified as selling to Americans, and are also requiring 
distributors to report past and current ‘bulk’ orders from pharmacies.275 In response to these 
practices, Minnesota’s Attorney General is investigating the possibility that companies which 
deliberately block drug supplies to specific pharmacies are violating anti-trust laws.276 A group 
of Minnesota senior citizens has also sued nine pharmaceutical manufacturers under federal 
antitrust laws and state consumer fraud laws.277 The seniors claim that the manufacturers broke 
the law by, “conspiring and otherwise acting in concert to prevent the sale of their brand name 
drugs to American consumers at Canadian prices . . .” in order to create and perpetuate, “a supra-
competitive pricing structure in the United States.”278 The seniors claim that because 21 U.S.C. 
Section 331(a) does not specifically prohibit importation of prescription drugs for personal use, 
they should be able to freely purchase Canadian drugs.279 
Another major problem is the growing discontent among Canadians regarding their 
forced participation in a domestic American political issue. Canadian Health Minister, Ujjal 
Dosanjh, has stated that he plans to take action to prevent Canadian doctors from co-signing 
prescriptions without examining patients.280 Dosanjh is also preparing legislation to cut or 
eliminate entirely, the sale of Canadian drugs to Americans.281 Even without adverse action by 
the pharmaceutical industry, Canada’s population of only 30 million people arguably does not 
have enough drug supplies to act as a supplier for the entire drug-using population in the United 
States. The loss of the Canadian drug supply will probably mean greater demand for low-cost 
drugs from even less regulated countries, like Mexico, or from internet pharmacies that provide 
little or no information on their drugs’ countries of origin. 
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V. IMPORTATION LITIGATION: NEW CURE OR JUST A PLACEBO?
Faced with continued legislative gridlock, importation advocates have turned to the 
option often chosen when the legislative process breaks down: the judiciary. Thus far, however, 
the only successful party in importation suits has been the FDA. 
A. CASE LAW IN SUPPORT OF CURRENT IMPORTATION LAWS 
In U.S. v. Rx Depot, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma 
conducted the first major legal review of drug importation laws.282 Rx Depot had been operating 
as an importer of Canadian drugs, collecting prescription information from Americans and 
transmitting them to Canadian doctors. The doctors would write prescriptions, and transmit them 
to Rx Depot’s Canadian pharmacy partners.283 After the FDA wrote letters to Rx Depot in March 
2003, warning the company that it was in violation of federal law, Rx Depot boldly opened 
approximately fifty additional stores.284 
In court, Rx Depot argued that the FDA had engaged in selective enforcement of 21 
U.S.C. Section 381.285 However, the court was unconvinced. In its November 2003 ruling, the 
court found no “constitutionally impermissible basis for the decision to institute enforcement 
action.” 286 The court stated that 21 U.S.C. Section 381 limits importation of drugs to the 
manufacturers of those drugs.287 Rx Depot and all its employees were restrained and enjoined 
from, “causing . . . the introduction, or delivery for introduction, into interstate commerce, 
including, but not limited to, the importation of, any article of drug . . . .”288 Since the Rx Depot 
decision, state pharmacy boards have taken similar action against other domestic importers of 
foreign drugs.289 
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B. NEW LITIGATION CHALLENGING CURRENT IMPORTATION LAWS 
1. Andrews v. United States HHS  
 
Since the passage of the MMA, several cases have been filed by consumers challenging 
the legality of current importation laws. For example, in March 2004, Ray and Gaylee Andrews, 
two senior citizens from Illinois with a drug bill of around $1,100 per month, filed suit in the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the Department of Health and Human 
Services, the Food and Drug Administration and Secretary Thompson.290 The suit alleged that 
the enforcement of the importation provisions of the MMA violated their Fifth Amendment 
rights of due process and that Secretary Thompson’s refusal to initiate an importation program 
was in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).291 
The court dismissed the constitutional claim stating, “the right to purchase drugs from a 
preferred source or at a preferred price – if there is such a right at all – is not fundamental,” as 
compared to certain other medical choices (like abortion).292 By that reasoning, the government’s 
ban on purchasing cheaper drugs from other countries “easily withstands rational basis 
scrutiny.”293 With regard to the APA complaint, the court held that the Secretary’s letter to 
sixteen United States Senators, “that he was unable to make the determination [regarding safety 
and cost effectiveness] . . . was not final agency action reviewable under the APA.”294 
2. Vermont v. Thompson  
 
The most significant recent legal challenge of importation laws arose from the FDA’s 
rejection of the State of Vermont’s petition295 to obtain a drug importation waiver. Vermont had 
requested that the FDA grant a local waiver of federal drug importation laws in order for the 
state to establish a program on behalf of the Vermont State Employee Medical Benefit Plan 
(VTSEMBP).296 Vermont’s program would have involved contracting with private providers to 
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create a system by which VTSEMBP members could forward their prescriptions to Canadian 
physicians familiar with their medical history and have them re-written as Canadian prescription, 
filled in a Canadian pharmacy.297 In its denial of the petition, the FDA concluded that, “it would 
be extremely unlikely that the State of Vermont could ensure that all the Canadian drugs which 
VTSEMBP helped its members obtain were in full compliance with all laws and regulations 
applicable to FDA-approved drug products,” (citing the Rx Depot decision).298 
Vermont responded with a lawsuit. In a complaint filed in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Vermont, the State claimed that the denial of their petition had been arbitrary, 
capricious, and unreasonable, and contrary to the obligations imposed by the importation 
provisions of the MMA.299 Vermont also argued that the Cochran Amendment itself, 21 U.S.C. 
Section 384(l)(1), violated the non-delegation doctrine (Article I, § 1 of the United States 
Constitution) by improperly delegating legislative power to the Executive.300 
The HHS’ Motion to Dismiss argued that the State had misinterpreted the MMA: “There 
is no language in section 384(l) that authorizes or contemplates any waiver, partial certification, 
experiment, or other temporary, limited or short-term program for importing prescription drugs 
from Canada [for states].”301 Rather, that provision of the law authorized waivers for individuals 
after such time, “when the Secretary makes a determination whether to issue a certification,” a 
question, “not subject to judicial review,” (emphasis in original).302 HHS also argued that 
section 384(l) merely “asked the Secretary of HHS to determine whether implementation of the 
provision relating to drug importation would be in the public interest,” and that such a 
conditional statute raises no constitutional concerns.303 
Vermont’s case against the federal government is a long shot, at best. The Cochran 
amendment is just as powerful a poison-pill today as it was in 2000.304 Vermont’s arguments 
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against the certification requirement might have carried some weight if they were based on a 
legislative interpretation of the words, “no additional risk” – the idea that any change to the 
current system would be less risky.305 At oral argument, Judge William Sessions seemed to 
follow this reasoning in his questions for the federal government’s attorneys, “There is an 
existing problem, there are many people – hundreds if not thousands – who cross the border 
every day to purchase pharmaceuticals. . . . Are you closing your eyes to a real problem?”306 
Vermont’s second claim, their non-delegation doctrine argument, seems almost certain to fail.307 
Ultimately, efforts like Vermont’s may accomplish little more than providing additional publicity 
to a growing public policy crisis.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has answered some of the extensive empirical and normative questions related 
to making prescription drugs more affordable through importation. In the final calculation, the 
question is not whether importation is the most effective solution for improving America’s 
health,308 but rather whether some form of regulated importation system is necessary for making 
the existing drug trade safe for the nation’s uninsured and low-income populations. Many experts 
believe that importation can be accomplished safely.309 However, in today’s America, safety is a 
distant priority to affordability. Lawmakers opposed to importation must offer affordability 
alternatives in order to have credibility on safety concerns.  
 The proponents of importation currently have the upper hand. The first step for the nation 
in moving toward a truly viable drug importation system with prescription drugs accessible for 
peoples of all ages and incomes, was to overcome existing fears of foreign medicines and pricing 
practices. That step has been achieved on some level. Additional progress will require a powerful 
combination of communicating to voters, intense federal and state legislative lobbying, legal 
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advocacy in the courts, and compelling public policy research. Only the combination of all of 
these forces can accomplish change on a broad scope in the area of prescription drug policy. 
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